Accessing and changing assessment results – Founded

Authority: This investigation was conducted under section 69 of the Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, c.22, ss. 12 and 13.

Issue: The purpose of this investigation was to determine whether a public servant committed fraud in an appointment process by using false pretenses to access documents related to the process.

Conclusion: The investigation concluded that the public servant committed fraud by using false pretenses to access documents related to the appointment process, and by changing some of these documents to falsely suggest that they were qualified, even though they knew they had been screened out.

Facts: A public servant applied to an advertised internal process but was eliminated for not meeting several screening criteria. Without authorization, the public servant used another employee’s computer credentials to access documents related to the appointment process. They then modified their results in several documents to make it appear that they had qualified for appointment.

A few months later, they enquired about the status of the appointment process. Human resources staff responded that the public servant should have received an email informing them of their elimination. When investigating why the public servant had not received the email, they noticed irregularities in documents related to the appointment process and requested a Public Service Commission investigation.

During the investigation, the public servant admitted they had accessed and changed the documents. They said they had been motivated by an urgent need to leave their workplace.

To conclude that fraud has occurred in an appointment process pursuant to section 69 of the Public Service Employment Act, 2 essential elements of fraud must be met: dishonesty and deprivation or risk of deprivation. The investigation concluded that the public servant knew it was dishonest to use another employee’s credentials to access appointment process documents and modify their results to appear qualified. The appointment process could have been compromised if the public servant’s actions had gone unnoticed.

Corrective action:

The public servant was dismissed after an internal security investigation.

Following the conclusion of fraud, the Commission ordered that:   

• for 3 years, the person must notify the Public Service Commission before accepting any position or work in the federal public service
  • failure to do so will result in the revocation of their appointment
• if the person accepts a position or work in the federal public service within 3 years, they must complete the Values and Ethics Foundations for Employees course offered by the Canada School of Public Service, and then have a discussion with their director
  • failure to do so will result in the revocation of their appointment

Investigation File No.: 21-22-08