Defence Procurement
Mr. Chair, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee as part of its study on defence procurement in the context of Canada’s commitment to increase military spending. I would like to acknowledge that this hearing is taking place on the traditional unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabe people. Joining me today is Isabelle Marsolais, director of our audit of future fighter jet capability, which was tabled in June 2025.
I will focus my remarks on 3 themes that have emerged from our audits of defence procurement and that are relevant in the current global context. These themes are delays and changes in scope when renewing equipment and its fleet; the availability of skilled personnel; and weaknesses in inventory management.
First, delays in renewing equipment and the fleet have real operational consequences. When new aircraft or ships are not delivered on time, older equipment must remain in service longer than planned or be retired before replacements are ready. This increases operating and maintenance costs and can limit operational capability.
We have seen this pattern across several audits. For example, in 2021, we audited the National Shipbuilding Strategy, which aims to deliver more than 50 science and defence vessels over the next 30 years. We found significant delays that were linked to design and construction challenges affecting many ships.
We also found delays in our 2022 audit of Arctic waters surveillance. Those delays increased the risks of gaps in surveillance, patrol, and presence, as aging satellites and patrol aircraft may reach the end of their service lives before replacements are operational.
The replacement of Canada’s fighter jets provides another example of delays affecting readiness. Canada purchased its CF-18s in the early 1980s, and they remain in service more than 20 years past their planned service life. While the government committed in late 2022 to acquiring 88 F‑35A fighter aircraft from the United States, our 2025 audit of the Future Fighter Capability Project found that cost estimates had significantly increased since 2022 and did not account for all the elements needed to achieve full operational capability. Key infrastructure projects were more than 3 years behind schedule, requiring interim solutions that will further increase costs.
This leads me to our second theme: Having enough skilled personnel is essential to support operational readiness.
In the case of fighter jets, National Defence expected to spend almost $3 billion to buy and operate Australian aircraft to extend the life of its fleet, but it did not have a plan to address the shortage of experienced pilots. Buying additional aircraft alone was not enough to meet both NORAD and NATO requirements.
Subsequently, our 2025 audit of the Future Fighter Capability Project found that the planned pilot training program for the F-35s would fall short of producing enough pilots by 2032–33 to meet operational requirements.
More recently, in our October 2025 report on Canadian Armed Forces recruitment, we found that recruitment and training remain a challenge for Canada’s military. In particular, the Canadian Armed Forces did not recruit and train enough people to meet its needs—especially for highly skilled occupations, like pilots and ammunition technicians.
The final theme I want to discuss is inventory management.
We have raised concerns in this area through our financial audits for about 20 years. In addition, our 2020 performance audit of the military supply chain found that units received essential items, such as spare parts, uniforms, and rations, late 50% of the time. These delays, often caused by stock shortages, hindered National Defence’s ability to operate efficiently.
Taken together, these audits underscore the importance of timely equipment and fleet renewal, reliable supply chains, and having enough skilled personnel. Weaknesses in any of these areas increase the risk of capability gaps that can undermine Canada’s ability to meet its domestic and international commitments or, in a crisis, impede a rapid military response.
Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have. Thank you.